

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

ENDC/PV.71

17 August 1962

ENGLISH

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

MAR 14 1963

DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday 17 August 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Mr. J. LINGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZENLA

Mr. V. TYLNER

Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU

ATO M. HAMID

ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LAIL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. P.M. GEORGE

Mr. G.D. COMAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Dr. G. FEA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. S. ROGUISKI
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESQU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. FATTAH HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Dr. R. PRESS

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN

Mr. C.C. STELLÉ

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General

Mr. O. LOUFTI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the seventy-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. It was agreed at the last meeting that we should continue the discussion on nuclear tests.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): This discussion follows the return of the United States representative from Washington, and the volumes of publicity given to the new position on the ending of nuclear tests that Mr. Dean was supposed to be bringing back with him from the United States. What are these new United States proposals? What, at the moment, are the respective positions of the nuclear Powers?

Let me draw the Committee's attention to certain features of these "new" proposals. Two points in particular are worth noting. The first concerns control posts. The Western Powers propose to reduce the number of these posts from that in their former proposals of 1958-61. But they insist on the organization of a certain - though smaller - number of posts under international supervision and control. On the other hand, the eight-Power memorandum says:

"Such a system" - that is, the control system - "might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions ..."

(ENDC/28, para.3).

That is also the position of the Soviet Union, which has accepted the memorandum as the basis for negotiation on a nuclear test ban treaty. There is therefore an enormous difference between the position of the countries which presented the memorandum and that of the Western Powers, which are demanding posts under international supervision and control.

The second question concerns inspection. In the past the Western Powers have advocated obligatory inspection. There has been no discoverable change in this position. In fact, Mr. Dean said after his return from Washington that he was still in favour of obligatory inspection. Perhaps it is better to quote the actual words of the United States representative:

"On the basis of these technical conclusions my Government has presented proposals which involve:

(1) acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspection;" (ENDC/PV.69, p.9)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

What is the position of the eight-Power memorandum towards the United States proposal on obligatory on-site inspections? It is expressed in these words:

"...The parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt."

(ENDC/28, para.4)

This is also the compromise position of the Soviet Union, since it has accepted the eight-Power memorandum as the basis of negotiations.

This brief comparison of the two positions (the "new" position of the United States and the position expressed in the memorandum - which is also that of the Soviet Union, since it has accepted the memorandum) shows that not only is the United States a long way from the position of the eight Powers, but that it is still in its old position. True, it is asking for a smaller number of control posts; none the less true, its position of principle is still the same in this respect. It is still insisting on obligatory on-site inspection, which it put forward as a condition precedent to the continuation of talks. At the same time it complains that its position has been called an ultimatum. But what else can one call a condition precedent to the continuation of talks? A condition precedent is always a condition precedent and always really an ultimatum.

Mr. Dean, returning from Washington with this position called new but really, as we have seen, the old United States position on tests, complains that the attempt of the United States delegation to represent its old position as a new one, as a compromise, has been called a "manoeuvre". He has said:

"I categorically reject, on behalf of my Government, that this is any manoeuvre. As representative of the United States Government I say it is not a manoeuvre, and was never conceived as a manoeuvre ..." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p.44).

The United Kingdom representative echoed Mr. Dean's complaint that this position should be called a manoeuvre aimed at misleading public opinion. He tried in his turn to present the position as a new and constructive one. He said:

"...in my view, it is a total and complete change. Far from standing on old positions we are proposing something quite new, which is wholly in line with the proposals in the eight-Power memorandum." (ENDC/PV.69, p.39)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

However, during the campaign to prepare the presentation by the Western Powers of these "new" proposals, the United States press was sufficiently explicit about the view held by responsible, official circles in the United States of the scope and significance of these proposals, and of the purpose with which they were made and presented. The most responsible United States newspapers reported again and again that members of the congressional Atomic Energy Committee had declared themselves satisfied that

"the United States Administration did not contemplate any significant retreat from the principles of international controls and inspection." 1/

In the same issue, under the sub-heading "Acceptance not expected", the paper continued:

"If committee members" (meaning members of the congressional committee) "were not particularly concerned about the apparent shift in American position away from demands for internationally manned control stations, it was largely because they were convinced that the Soviet Union would not accept United States demands for on-site inspection to check on suspicious events detected by the control stations. Committee members felt that all the discussions about modifications and compromise would prove fruitless."

On 6 August the same paper made the following comment on the United States position:

"An important factor in the congressional committee's attitude was a conviction that the Russians would reject the American proposal anyway."

From American press statements on the views of influential United States circles it appears that these proposals were prepared and presented, not to be accepted by the Soviet Union, but to be rejected. It is precisely because the Western Powers knew that these proposals were bound to be rejected by the USSR - which has adopted the position of the eight-Power memorandum on nuclear tests - that the proposals were presented here. I should like to point out that what I have quoted are not articles merely expressing their authors' opinions, but information which the reporters of this important paper have gathered in United States official circles.

In view of these facts one asks who is telling the truth. Should we, as a Western representative put it - undeservedly - on another occasion, regard the American journalists who reported this news as "damned liars", or should we suppose that Mr. Dean has made a mistake?

1/ New York Times, 3 August 1962.

, (Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

In any case members of the Committee must needs be clear in their minds. It is difficult to believe that a responsible paper like the New York Times and its staff should knowingly have reported falsehoods about the policy and attitude of the United States Government and the members of the congressional Atomic Energy Committee, and about United States policy in general on the ending of nuclear tests.

Moreover, the position presented here by the United States representative speaks for itself. More is needed than words to change this position into a new one. The mere words of Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber are not enough to make their old position, their former inflexible position, a new position of compromise. That is the reality about the "new" United States proposals, which turn out to be just the old United States position stated under the new conditions made by the eight non-aligned Powers' memorandum.

The Western Powers have not really gone to much trouble. They have touched up their old proposals a little, put them in a new light, and brought out the old goods under a new label. But that is no way to achieve results on the ending of nuclear tests. The only way to end nuclear tests now is to accept the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers as the basis for negotiating a treaty on the ending of tests.

I should like now to touch upon an argument often used by the Western representatives to justify their old position. We have often heard the Western representatives put forward the idea that it is necessary to start technical discussions between scientists and experts on obligatory control and inspection. They have again and again tried to draw the Committee into a technical discussion already rendered obsolete by the course of events and especially by the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers. The other day the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, again challenged the Soviet Union to prove that inspection should not be obligatory, to bring its scientists here to present their detection-methods. At the meeting of 14 August he said:

"...if the Soviet Union does know scientific methods of identification which would leave no residue of unidentified events we earnestly invite it to show us how it could be done. Is that such an unreasonable request?" (ENDC/PV.69, p.41) And he insisted once again that Soviet scientists should come to Geneva for discussions with Western scientists to show the necessity for obligatory inspection.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Now we should not forget that the American scientists who have come here have all, or nearly all, had a hand in preparing and executing Project Vela, by which the United States Government intended to prove that it was impossible to sign a treaty on the ending of nuclear tests. By force of circumstances, however, and above all after the introduction of the eight-Power memorandum, the tests undertaken under Project Vela had to produce findings supporting the present United States position, the one called "new".

We do not wish to dwell on these questions at present, as to go over their history would take some time. In any case, the very purpose of Project Vela shows why the American scientists and seismologists have been brought here. The United States Government has sent them to prove that inspection must be obligatory and that the posts must be internationally supervised. That is its intention.

We should note that the United States and United Kingdom Governments have not sent to Geneva experts whose views on the scope, meaning and incidence of the new findings on the detection and identification of seismic events are opposed to official government opinions. They have brought scientists whose views are in line with their own; they have not attempted to consult those American and British experts who say that national systems are sufficient to verify that tests have been stopped.

In these circumstances we cannot help considering what would be the results of an experts' discussion, seeing that the American experts are brought here to prove that the United States position should be accepted, despite the eight-Power memorandum and the clear findings of recent research. A technical discussion of that kind could only result in prolonging the debate and plunging the Committee into an interminable discussion on various data during which both sides would stick rigidly to their respective positions. It would lead us nowhere. Nothing but a political decision by the United States and United Kingdom Governments would now enable our efforts towards an agreement to progress. It is a political decision that is necessary, not an interminable technical debate.

It is regrettable that in his speech the other day Mr. Dean quite categorically stated that the United States Government had decided to stick to its old position. He thereby showed that any technical discussions that might be organized here, and any evidence that might be put forward, could not change one iota in the United States position. He stated, in fact:

"... there will always be, even with the best system, some number of unidentified events with respect to which there will have to be on-site inspection." (ENDC/PV.70, p.38)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

So, Mr. Dean said, there will always be such events. That is the view of the United States Government. It is especially clear after this statement by Mr. Dean that whatever discussions took place between scientists the United States Government would still consider that there will always be events needing on-site inspection.

In those circumstances how could we work out a control system based on the proposals of the eight non-aligned Powers? In any scientists' discussion one could always argue that there will be events which cannot be clearly identified, that detection and identification with the help of certain instruments could not be considered - especially if this system of detection or identification were presented by the opposing side and not by that which has launched the discussion to prove that obligatory inspection is necessary. The point of switching the discussion on to a technical foundation is to drag the talks out ad infinitum; whereas, if the United States and other western Powers showed goodwill and their Governments took the political decision to finish nuclear tests once and for all, the talks could quickly succeed.

So it is not very convincing to demand that technical discussions should take place with scientists who have been brought here to support and prove a position taken. It is even less convincing when the United States representative states that, even with the best detection system, there will always be a certain number of unidentified events for which on-site inspection will be necessary.

In their eagerness to prove the necessity of on-site inspection for ending tests, the Western representatives do not hesitate to assimilate the ending of nuclear tests to disarmament measures, to identify verification and inspection of the stopping of tests with verification of general and complete disarmament. In his speech on 14 August, after claiming that the implications of the Soviet position with regard to inspection on nuclear tests were disturbing, the United States representative said:

"Let us apply this position of the Soviet Union to verification of other disarmament measures. ... If the Soviet position on verification for a reduction in armaments is consistent with its position on verification of a nuclear test ban treaty, is the Soviet Union then really contending that any verification in a disarmament agreement can be by invitation only?" (ENDC/PV.69, pp.19-20)

Mr. Dean is here referring to principle 6 of the joint statement on general and complete disarmament, the gist of which we all know (ENDC/5, para.6)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Mr. Godber took the same line, saying that if the Soviet Union could not accept inspection on nuclear tests -- which in his opinion demand only a minimal, though obligatory, inspection -- it could not accept measures of control on general and complete disarmament. In his speech on 14 August the United Kingdom representative said:

"If it should prove impossible to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban -- an agreement which after all requires a minimum verification -- then what rational expectation could we as honest men have, what expectation could the world have, that we could reach agreement on general and complete disarmament which, as has already been shown so many times here, requires very much more rigorous verification and involves much more complicated aspects of national defence?"

(ENDC/PV.69 pp.33-34)

One can only be amazed that the United States and United Kingdom representatives should seek to confuse such completely different measures. We thought it was agreed a long time ago that there should be control of disarmament measures and no control without disarmament. This has become an axiom in our Committee's efforts to put the general principles of disarmament into practice. But this eagerness of the Western representatives to confuse a nuclear test ban with disarmament measures is very strange. Compelled by the joint statement to admit that no verification can be applied without corresponding disarmament measures, they now do all in their power to link a test ban with disarmament measures, and above all with general and complete disarmament. We should like to refresh their memory a little. Not long ago they were not only denying the urgency and importance of a nuclear test ban, but also insisting that a test ban would not be a disarmament measure but, on the contrary, would do nothing to safeguard international security. Mr. Cabot Lodge, the United States representative at the twelfth session of the United Nations General Assembly, stated that

"A separate approach to the problem of suspending tests of nuclear weapons was impractical because it did not go to the heart of the real problem confronting the world, namely, the danger of war...". ^{2/}

He declared on the same occasion that a test ban was not a disarmament measure.

The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Noble, was even more explicit in his speech of 14 October 1957. He said:

"I believe that all States are now agreed that in fact the suspension of tests is not itself a measure of disarmament ... it is a fact that we have been pointing out for many months past." (A/C.1/PV.869, p.16)

2/ (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, First Committee, 866th meeting, para.12.)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Now the Western representatives are doing all in their power to show that we must have inspection without any disarmament measures, although according to their earlier statements the ending of nuclear tests is not a disarmament measure. We are astonished to see the United Kingdom representative now presenting the ending of tests as a disarmament measure solely because that happens to suit his case. Should we conclude from this that what the United Kingdom representative said in 1957 did not represent the opinion of the British Government, or that this opinion has so much changed that the British Government can now regard the ending of tests as a disarmament measure? Is the position adopted by the United Kingdom representative at the General Assembly in 1957 no longer valid for the United Kingdom representative at this Conference?

However that may be, the Western representatives' position on the need of obligatory on-site inspection for something which is not a disarmament measure, is not merely strange but displays a total lack of intention on the part of their governments to reach an agreement on tests.

While we are on the subject, since the Western representatives seem to find these backward glances into the cessation of nuclear tests much to their taste, I should like to remind you of certain past statements of those representatives and to compare them with what they have said in this Committee.

On 24 July the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, said:

"The United Kingdom wants to end tests once and for all. Mr. Menon said ... in his speech that the Government of India had proposed it as long ago as 1954, and that is true; but if we are competing in establishing our good faith in this matter, then I think the United Kingdom comes a little before that."

(UNDC/PV.60, pp.22-23)

We ourselves know well that India has never faltered in its determination to put an end to nuclear tests once and for all, and we must pay tribute to it for this attitude. We are, however, truly astonished that the United Kingdom Government and its representatives should dare to claim credit for the same thing. We are rather inclined to believe that in the past the Western Powers were firmly opposed to the ending of nuclear tests. Other United Kingdom representatives have sounded the same note as their Foreign Secretary did in his speech of 24 July. That is why I wish to remind you of that country's attitude towards this important question.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Also during the twelfth session of the United Nations General Assembly, at the same meeting, the United Kingdom representative said:

"It is also evident from the Indian draft resolutions before us that the Government of India likewise sincerely believes that the suspension of tests could facilitate negotiations on disarmament. ... to my mind the execution of this measure unconnected with disarmament ... could well have an adverse effect on world security". (A/C.1/PV.869, pp.17-18)

Later he added:

"In any case, my Government is not prepared to gamble on this. ... we must retain our right to test and improve the nuclear deterrent ..." (ibid.)

That was the position of the Western Powers on the cessation of nuclear tests. That, in particular, was the position of the United Kingdom. This goes to show that much water has flowed under the bridge since the Western Powers heatedly opposed all efforts towards cessation of nuclear tests. But we should be the first to rejoice if these Powers now modified their position. It is true that their statements have changed; but one wonders if their true intentions have not remained the same. Their insistence on imposing obligatory inspection and international control on measures which they themselves in the past refused to regard as disarmament measures is indeed highly significant. This insistence shows that the Western Powers are still opposed to any agreement on a nuclear test ban, and that is why they put so many obstacles in the way of a solution of this problem.

As has already been repeatedly explained, the problem of a nuclear test ban is in no way a problem of obligatory control and inspection; it is in no way a problem requiring prolonged technical studies and discussions. It is a problem which requires a political decision by the Western Powers. All that is lacking for a solution to this problem is a sincere desire on the part of the Western Powers to put an end to nuclear tests on the basis of the measures proposed in the eight-Power memorandum, which represents a sincere attempt at compromise. If the Western Powers wish to prove that their desire to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban is sincere, all they have to do is to accept the memorandum of the eight non-aligned Powers as a basis of negotiations, as the Soviet Union has done. Then, and then only, would the ending of nuclear tests become an imminent reality.

Mr. CASTRO (Brazil): I am under instructions from my Government to acquaint the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament with the terms of an official note of the Government of Brazil on the cessation of nuclear tests. This note is being issued today at Brasilia, and I kindly request you, Mr. Chairman, to have it circulated as a Conference document. 3/ The text is as follows:

"The Government of Brazil follows with great interest and expectation the current negotiations in the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, particularly those regarding the cessation of nuclear tests.

"The Government of Brazil hopes that mutual concessions on the part of the nuclear Powers will permit them to reach an agreement on the modality of control envisaged in the eight-nation joint memorandum of 16 April 1962, of which Brazil is one of the co-sponsors.

"To this effect, the Government of Brazil will seek all diplomatic means of action with the nuclear Powers and other States represented in the Conference.

"The Government of Brazil has instructed its delegation to the Disarmament Conference to support all proposals likely to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement. Among such proposals, special reference should be made to the suggestion advanced by the delegation of Mexico on 9 May last concerning a deadline for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

"Should, against all hope, no positive results be achieved in Geneva, Brazil will make renewed efforts, with the same objectives, before the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations."

May I take this opportunity to raise very briefly two points which I feel may prove to be of some interest and to be relevant to the conduct of our discussion of this item of a nuclear test ban? Both points are of a procedural character.

The first is this. I confess I am somewhat puzzled by the relentless debate that was engaged in at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.70) on the right interpretation to be given to some sections of the eight-nation joint memorandum (ENDC/28). There has been an active exchange of polemics with regard to certain paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of that document. Some argue that it is evident that paragraphs this and that should be interpreted so; others contend that paragraphs this and that are so clear as to do away with the need for any interpretation, which may in itself be a subtle and intelligent mode of interpretation. Others say that it is of the utmost

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

importance and relevance to ascertain the real intentions of the law-makers lest we be led astray in our present endeavours.

As one of the co-sponsors of the joint memorandum, my delegation feels very flattered that the nuclear Powers should take such pains and spend so much of their time in seeking to ascertain the real and exact purposes behind the words of our joint document. I am not speaking for the eight since, as we well know, only the eight can speak for the eight, but, if I may be allowed to express a very personal view, I wonder whether -- with all due respect -- this courtroom debate, so to speak, on our ultimate intentions is really fostering our progress on this most crucial matter of a nuclear test ban or is moving us closer to an agreement. In my opinion, the real intention of the eight nations is to urge the nuclear Powers to negotiate with a view to concluding a mutually acceptable agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

As I see it courtroom procedures have not changed much since my youthful days as a lawyer. At that time the efforts with regard to interpretation were concentrated on the dead letter of the law when the judge was seized of a particular feud on which to pass judgement. It was not so in the case of legislative bodies dealing with the law-making stages of a given statute. And, I venture to say, on this question of a nuclear test ban we are still at the law-making stage.

I emphasize that the eight nations should be flattered by the scrupulous and punctilious zeal of the nuclear Powers regarding their memorandum, but I wish to reassure the nuclear Powers in this connexion. If the nuclear Powers do, as we earnestly hope, through negotiation conducted in a spirit of compromise and mutual concessions, reach an agreement on the interpretation to be given to a certain paragraph or sub-paragraph of the memorandum, I would venture to say that the eight nations would accept such an interpretation if it carried with it the cessation of all nuclear tests. Thus it is my suggestion that the nuclear Powers should be neither timid, reluctant nor over-zealous as far as we are concerned. They should go ahead immediately, negotiating on the basis of our joint proposal, which is really and basically a framework for negotiation -- an invitation to negotiate, as it has been described, and not a text of positive law to be interpreted and strictly implemented.

Let us be frank; the differences and divergencies which now exist are not differences and divergencies between the position of each individual side and the position of the eight which, as far as my delegation can see, is not a position by itself, but an earnest appeal for negotiation. The differences and divergencies

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

that still prevail are really differences and divergencies between the two sides; and those outstanding differences can only be settled by negotiation between the two sides.

Furthermore, I wish to give this formal assurance to the nuclear Powers: I commit myself to plead their common cause and, before the other seven, to defend the interpretation upon which they may decide, with one sole proviso, namely, that that interpretation would not permit, in any circumstances, the unchecked continuance of nuclear tests. I commit myself to that task because I feel that it will be a very easy task indeed.

My second point is the following. Three weeks ago, at our plenary meeting of 25 July, my delegation raised the points contained in the following statement:

"It has been implied that a nuclear test ban is difficult to attain because the great Powers cannot or do not wish to agree on the intricate question of control, a problem which is based on confidence. It is well known, however, that the main divergencies and discrepancies do lie in the problems of detection and identification of underground tests; as the international control required for atmospheric and outer space tests does not appear to present so many insurmountable difficulties. Why, then, not concentrate our efforts on this question of atmospheric and outer space tests which are the most dangerous, actually and potentially, and the ones which have a most disturbing effect on mind, body and nerves? Why not, along the lines of the eight-nation joint memorandum, further explore the possibility of an agreement on the question of control of atmospheric and outer space tests and, at the same time, start a discussion on the adequate methods of detection and identification of underground tests?

"We are of course prepared to accept any other procedure which would prove to be most conducive to an early agreement on the overall problem of nuclear tests." (ENDC/PV.61, p.36)

We were not making a specific "proposal" then; we were only submitting a question, a question obviously addressed to the three members of the sub-Committee on nuclear tests. Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, was kind enough to add (ENDC/PV.64, p.6) her own "why not?" to our question and, on other lines, the question was reiterated by the representatives of Burma and Mexico, although Mr. Barrington felt that we were trying to deprive the nuclear Powers of their most

(Mr. Castro, Brazil)

dangerous toys (ENDC/PV.65, p.16). Again, at this stage, we are not making a proposal; we are only repeating a question.

At the last meeting of the sub-Committee on nuclear tests (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23), the debate centred almost exclusively on the problem of underground tests, as they are considered to be the major stumbling block on the road to the cessation of all nuclear tests. My delegation has stated repeatedly that we should spare no effort to conclude a mutually acceptable and comprehensive nuclear test ban as early as possible. If that overall objective continues to prove difficult to attain -- which, I hope, will not be the case -- perhaps the sub-Committee might tackle the problem by successive steps, by considering, in the first place, an agreement on the kinds of tests the control of which does not appear to present the insurmountable difficulties to which I referred above. That, I venture to submit, might represent a methodological approach likely to help the sub-Committee in its endeavours to reach a solution of the problem of a nuclear test ban.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Although the United States and the United Kingdom have constantly studied their proposals in an effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and have tried constantly to put forward far-reaching proposals in an effort to arrive at an agreement, the Soviet Union has not made a single move -- I repeat not a single move -- in response. Nevertheless, on Wednesday last, 15 August, the representative of the United Arab Republic put a question which, at the present stage of our Conference should be a challenge to us all. He suggested that our deliberations should turn to the question: "When should on-site inspection be necessary in practice?" (ENDC/PV.70, p.24). And he went on to suggest that, rather than arguing from fixed positions -- and this, I submit, the United States and the United Kingdom have not done -- our discussion "should move to the realm of the practical, the adequate and the necessary (ibid.)".

In considering what is practical as well as necessary we must first look once more at the accepted and undisputed scientific facts bearing on the ability of a detection system to detect and identify underground nuclear tests on the basis of seismic data alone. At our last two meetings I explained to this Conference -- I am afraid in considerable detail -- the reasons why the United States, on the basis of the scientific research of the United States, the United Kingdom and other scientists here, believes that a superior nuclear detection system of the type which we have

(Mr. Dean, United States)

described would detect each year numerous events which the system, even though improved, would not be able to identify either as underground nuclear explosions or as earthquakes. That is to say, it would not be possible to identify as earthquakes or nuclear explosions all the events the system could detect.

I indicated that such a system might detect approximately 300 seismic events each year from territory controlled by the Soviet Union. For most of those which occur deeper than 50-60 kilometres the depth will be determined by the new arrays of fathometers with sufficient reliability to assure that they are of natural origin. Reasonably accurate depths will be determined also for many of those which occur at lesser depths, although the nearer the surface the less useful and reliable the method is. That is because the earth's crust is complex, and as a consequence the seismic data are increasingly difficult to interpret and the depths are less accurately known.

There are many practical limitations of a similar nature which limit the determination of ability to identify an earthquake by first motion registered on the seismograph. This identification by first motion is complicated by the fact that some types of earthquakes, like explosions, give outward first motion in all directions. Another fact is the small magnitude of the signal given by first motion compared to the signal given by succeeding oscillations of the seismograph, which is a highly delicate instrument. Because of that, and because of the continuing presence of background noise, the true first motion is frequently lost in the local background noise where the recording instrument is located. Thus, identification of earthquakes by using the first-motion criterion is reliable primarily for large events when the detection station is near the source of the event. As I indicated at the plenary meeting on Wednesday, 15 August, a substantial number of the events would be eliminated because they occurred under coastal waters and in locations such as, for example, the Kamchatka Peninsula or the Kurile Islands in the Soviet Union, in which it could be safely assumed they would be earthquakes (ENDC/PV.70,p.42). That is a purely subjective determination based on experience and historical seismic knowledge.

Even after all those events had been eliminated, with varying degrees of confidence, there would still be in each year between 50 and 75 unidentified events in the Soviet Union, each one of which might be an underground nuclear explosion and each one of which could be identified positively only by an objective on-site inspection. The number of unidentified events in the United States in each year would be somewhat larger than in the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I am aware that the Soviet Union representative has challenged this contention (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p.25) and has stated that in no case would on-site inspection be necessary to identify underground nuclear tests; but since he has signally failed to supply the Conference with any scientific support for the Soviet Union's position I am forced to regard its objections to on-site inspections as being based on purely political rather than on technical scientific grounds.

In considering the extent to which on-site inspections are practically necessary consideration must be given to whether it is important to have the parties to the treaty able really to satisfy themselves on sound grounds whether some of those 50-75 annually detected but unidentified events which will occur each year in the Soviet Union -- and, as I have said, a somewhat greater number in the United States -- were produced by earthquakes or by underground nuclear explosions. I assume that that was what the representative of Poland was referring to when he pointed out that paragraph 4 of the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), in referring to the obligation of a party to furnish the commission with facts, mentioned facts concerning "any suspicious and significant event". I assume that that also is what he was alluding to when he referred on Wednesday last (ENDC/70, p.15) to the balance of risks in accepting a treaty under which clandestine testing might take place as opposed to the risk of having no treaty at all.

In considering the risk of clandestine testing underground I am, of course, tempted to refer again to the very interesting story which the Soviet representative told us during his remarks at the plenary meeting on Wednesday last (ENDC/PV.70, p.48) concerning the unfortunate virgin lady with the small baby. Based on recent United States scientific experience, which is verifiable, the answer is that relatively small tests conducted underground can be very important. Therefore I think one can go further than that and point out that truly scientific progress in weapons development can be and has been achieved through underground tests which, even though they might be detected by a seismic network, cannot be identified except by an objective on-site inspection. In other words, big results militarily could come from very small unidentified tests, just as the status of the unfortunate virgin was changed by the birth of a small baby. True, they represent only a part of the arms race as it is represented by nuclear testing. But such small tests represent so sufficiently large a part that no nuclear Power should be called upon to assume an obligation not to conduct nuclear tests without being satisfactorily assured that other nuclear Powers also are not, in fact, conducting this type of test.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

As a few specific illustrations of the developments that can be made with small -- and, indeed, very small -- underground explosions, I would enumerate the following:

1. development and testing of tactical weapons;
2. development and improvement of the small initiating portion of larger weapons;.
3. tests of weapons effects, namely, of the damages caused by shock, blast, X-rays and neutrons;
4. development of basically new weapons as, for example, the pure fusion weapon about which so much has been written and said.

This fusion weapon may be developed from very small underground nuclear explosions. There are even larger tests which, although they might be detected, could not be identified by a seismic network if only modest attempts to conceal identification were made by conducting tests in seismic areas, and in a medium like loosely consolidated gravel or earth known as alluvium, which was discussed in the Defense Department release of 7 July 1962. Such tests might go into the 100 kiloton range without being identified. If representatives will refer to that document they will see that, based on the Gnome explosion in the United States,

"Wide variations in signal strength have also been found to occur when the medium surrounding the shotpoint is changed. Thus, alluvium has been found to 'muffle' the distant seismic signal by as much as ten times over that expected from a similar shot in volcanic tuff, whereas hard rock such as salt or granite increases the signal size by about a factor of two. With such experimental data at hand, it is likely to be possible, with further study and analysis, to determine within practical limits the effect of other containing mediums of signal generation." (ENDC/45, p.2)

And, further, they will see that:

"Thus, for a shot of 3 kilotons yield in hard rock, consistent compressional motion has been observed out to a distance of 450 miles. In contrast a much larger shot in alluvium gave consistent outward motion only to 250 miles at which time the motion became random."

(ibid. p.3)

We know that, and yet we are prepared to take political risks in pursuing a comprehensive treaty.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Tests of such nuclear weapons can be valuable on many counts. They will include proof tests, development tests and a variety of weapons effects tests. Nor are such tests necessarily a part of a lengthy test series. Valuable weapons effects information can and will often call for only a single test -- a series is not necessary; or they may be a part of a series in which other events go undetected. Who knows precisely what a series is if some of the events go undetected? A single test may well be converted into very meaningful results, without any other tests, with significant laboratory work.

Let me be clear. The United States does want and has consistently worked for a comprehensive treaty which would ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. We have consistently moved towards that end. I am amazed when I hear statements to the effect that the United States has not moved. We have done much research and work to get a treaty. The United States is not seeking a will-of-the-wisp of a completely foolproof treaty. It recognizes that there is no such thing in this uncertain world. It is well aware that there are risks in a test ban treaty. It is prepared to accept them, as it has indicated by its willingness to move the negotiations along and to accept the risks inherent in an effective detection system the detection capability of which was downgraded somewhat below that which it had previously been discussing. That is why I have referred representatives this morning to the Department of Defense release of 7 July on effective testing in alluvium.

On the other hand the United States believes that the proposed international commission is entitled, as a matter of unequivocal right, to a degree of on-site inspection which is related to the degree of risk to the United States and any other party to the treaty from possible violation of the nuclear test ban treaty. The United States believes that the degree of risk from the wide range of underground tests which could only be identified as tests by on-site inspection is sufficiently great that, on the basis of the best and so far undisputed scientific opinion here, it is entitled to the degree of assurance which can only be obtained if there is an obligation on the part of the country where the unidentified event occurs to permit and to facilitate on-site inspection of detected but unidentified events.

I have referred to that scientific data as being undisputed. If it is not undisputed, then let us hear the scientific evidence to the contrary here at Geneva. Let us track down this scientific evidence to which the representative of Bulgaria referred this morning (*supra*, p.9) and let us examine it very carefully. We are

(Mr. Dean, United States)

prepared to have our scientific experts here and we are quite prepared to have our scientific data carefully scrutinized and reviewed. I have made that offer many times and so far it has not been taken up. Therefore I submit that all of us must conclude that there is no scientific evidence to the contrary. If there were it would have been produced, and it has not been produced.

It has been argued here that, since it is not the individual underground test but rather a series of underground tests that is important, mandatory on-site inspection becomes substantially less important since it is probable that one or more in the series would be detected and identified even without obligatory on-site inspection. I submit that that argument draws on unwarranted conclusions from a false premise. In the first place, as I have already indicated, individual shots of the magnitude we are now discussing can be quite important. In the second place, the major deterrent to a series of tests comes from the fact that a potential violator does not know which one might be certified by the commission as eligible for an on-site inspection. That fact -- and it is a very important one -- has already been taken into account by the United States and by the United Kingdom in their position on on-site inspection.

As may be noted, the position of the United States is that not all unidentified events should be subject to on-site inspection but only a relatively small percentage of those events, on the assumption that that small percentage on a sample basis would serve as an adequate deterrent to a potential violator and give each side reasonable assurance that the other side was complying with the nuclear test ban treaty. If, for example, the number of inspections is roughly equivalent to one out of five unidentified events, there is substantial probability -- I repeat, substantial probability -- that a series may not go undetected and unidentified by inspection. All this, however, is based upon the assumption that the inspection by the commission is obligatory and non-arguable and that the country on whose territory the unidentified seismic event has taken place cannot avoid the obligation of such inspection by stating that it was merely an earthquake, or that the evidence of the commission is inadequate, or that the time of entry proposed by the commission is not convenient, and requesting that it wait a few weeks and thus refuse to issue promptly and without cavil an invitation to the commission for an on-site inspection.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I am aware of the argument, in support of the invitational nature of on-site inspections, that an on-site inspection team -- even if the right were worded as obligational, even if we had our way -- would never be permitted to conduct an on-site inspection if in the view of a host country the inspection would disclose evidence of a clandestine test in violation of the treaty. From that premise, the arguments proceeds: why should not the on-site inspections be made avowedly invitational? Why should we not rely upon the moral obloquy of a refusal? The representative of Poland posed the question: who would dare refuse? (ENDC/PV.70,p.14). I submit that this premise is quite false and completely misses the point of the need for on-site inspection.

The question before us is not what type of system of on-site inspection is most apt to discover a violation of the treaty. The question should rather be: what type of on-site inspection should be provided that is most likely to serve as a deterrent so that there never will be a violation of the treaty? The question is also what type of on-site inspection system is most likely to preserve the treaty in force when there are no violations? I submit that the answer to those questions quite clearly points to the obligatory nature of on-site inspections. A detection network by itself without obligatory on-site inspections is really worse than nothing, and I emphasize that. In the present state of our knowledge the seismographs merely raise questions which they do not answer. If there could be no on-site inspections to remove the doubt that might exist in the case of these unidentified events, the treaty would suffer an untimely and an unjustified end, perhaps without just cause. The existence of this large number of detected but unidentified events without any ability to verify would be bound to raise doubts and suspicions. There might indeed be cases where unpeaceful persons and groups would take advantage of the presence of many such unidentified events and would make a charge that the treaty was being violated, and what means would we have to prove the contrary? The international atmosphere could be poisoned and tensions might mount; without on-site inspection no resolution of the doubts could occur. Such a treaty, without on-site inspections, would result in an increase in tension rather than a decrease.

It was precisely that type of situation that Mr. Zorin and Mr. McCloy, speaking for their Governments, sought to avoid in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations. They recognized the importance of having verification

(Mr. Dean, United States)

measures which assured the parties that the obligations undertaken were being honoured. That is why they included in that joint statement the principle that:

"6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations."

(ENDC/5).

That is why also they inserted into the same principle the provision that the disarmament organization and its inspectors "should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification". Those principles have a direct bearing on the question of the verification of an agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests. They tell us why we need to have some obligatory on-site inspection for effective verification.

I listened this morning with great interest, as I always do, to the intervention of the representative of Brazil and to the statement issued by his Government in Brazil (supra.pp.14-17). I shall study his remarks with great care.

I feel that this problem is not going to be solved effectively unless we really continue our efforts. I assure the Committee that the United States for its part is willing to do everything it can to negotiate sincerely, and indeed courageously, in an effort to bring about a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. That is our objective, and we do not propose to give up that objective. So it seems to me that the ball is clearly in the Soviet court. Will our Soviet colleagues refuse to play it? I hope not. Let us have an affirmative response from our Soviet colleagues and get on with the job of drafting an effective and workable nuclear test ban treaty, so that all tests everywhere can stop.

Mr. MALITZA (Romania): During our meetings this week devoted to the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, a fact of historic significance has arrested the attention of the whole of mankind and directed our thoughts to subjects closely linked with the work of this Committee. I am referring to the group flight of the Soviet astronauts, who covered a distance much farther than the distance to the moon and back and extended the conditions of man's life and work to a new environment -- outer space. First of all, there is the striking contrast between the wide scope and the pace of the scientific and technical progress embodied in this feat, on the one hand, and the state of stagnation observed by all of us as

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

regards the major issues constituting the topics of our discussions, on the other hand. It is an impressive reminder of the responsibility incumbent upon us to keep pace with the creative activities in the field of science and technology and to liquidate a state of affairs which not only is in contradiction with those activities but, more than that, generates the risk of rendering them void and even directing them against the interests of mankind. It is with deep satisfaction that we underline the statement (ENDC/57) issued in the Soviet Union on 15 August 1962, which links with the epoch-making peaceful feat accomplished by the Soviet people an appeal addressed to all governments and peoples to struggle even more determinedly in order to free mankind from the threat of nuclear war and to ensure peace throughout the world. We wholeheartedly congratulate the brave Soviet astronauts and the scientists and technicians who made this achievement possible. It is our sincere desire that one of the results obtained from their space flight may be a fresh impetus towards the settlement of our terrestrial issues.

Allow me today to make just a few remarks concerning the cessation of nuclear tests, an issue of great importance with respect to which the position of my delegation has been made clear in the course of our previous meetings. Our Committee must reach a political decision of great importance and particular urgency: the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. However, as the discussion goes on, it becomes more and more clear that it is not this issue that the Western delegations are concerned with. One cannot explain otherwise the fact that, although actually there exist all the conditions for the conclusion of a treaty, one point -- one single point -- could not be settled because the Western delegations exaggerate its difficulties beyond all measure and turn it into a means of blocking agreement. Judging from the way the representative of the United States talks, we cannot but note that it is not the cessation of nuclear tests that he has in mind but something of a totally different nature, namely, how to obtain inspection and control over the other party's territory.

Objective conditions for the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty do exist. Life and science prove that all nuclear tests can be detected and identified through existing national means of detection, regardless of the environment in which they are carried out. However, the position of the United States and the United Kingdom on the issue of underground nuclear tests hinders the conclusion of an agreement. The Western delegations assert that very small natural phenomena under a certain level cannot be distinguished from underground nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Mălitza, Romania)

It is in that way that they try to explain and justify their desire to establish a system of international control consisting of control posts and on-site inspection in order to ascertain the exact nature of underground phenomena so that nuclear explosions could be distinguished from such natural phenomena as earthquakes. Practice proves, however, that underground nuclear tests also are being detected and identified. Each country has identified the underground nuclear tests carried out by the other party. Detection stations in many other countries have done so, as the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, eloquently pointed out (ENDC/PV.64, p.13) in her well documented statement of 1 August.

Why, then, is reality being turned upside down, and why are we asked to proceed to the conclusion of a treaty starting from such a hypothesis? Why should one invoke a hypothetical fear, a hypothetical risk, for solving the problem we are confronted with? Is it not clear that in this way an obstacle is being raised which makes our negotiations sterile and blocks the way to an agreement? The United States delegation is trying now to convince us that it has submitted new proposals marking a change from its previous position. It aims at creating the appearance that two essential changes have been made in its old position, one concerning control stations and the other concerning on-site inspection. Referring to the first of these, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, said at our sixty-ninth meeting:

"... the West now accepts completely the principle that detection posts may be operated by nationals of the country concerned. That is a qualitative change of position, a change of principle."

(ENDC/PV.69, p.43)

In the same connexion, he said that that would present "a total and complete change" (ibid., p.39). In fact there is neither a qualitative change nor a modification of principle. Under the system proposed by the United States Government, the control stations -- and I am referring to the specifications made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, as reported on page 14-15 of the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.69) of that same meeting -- would be supervised and monitored by the international commission, which would prescribe scientific standards concerning their activities and ensure additional training of national personnel according to agreed standards and the equipping of stations with instruments calibrated according to standards established by the commission; and even the locating of the control posts would come after consultation with the commission. In such conditions the control posts would be national in name only.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

As for on-site inspections it is to be noted that Mr. Godber himself has recognized that only a quantitative change is involved. In spite of efforts deployed on this occasion to suggest that a numerical change would here have an importance of principle, no change emerged with the effect of altering the essence of the position of the Western Powers in this case either. As in the past those Powers insist now upon the principle of obligatory on-site inspection as a condition sine qua non for the conclusion of a treaty, a condition which has an obviously ultimative character.

Now, as in the past, we are repeatedly told that in order to identify each suspicious seismological signal numerous control posts and inspections will be necessary on the territory of every nuclear Power. However, in order to "meet the Soviet Union half way", we are told, the Western Powers have consented not to verify each case separately but to verify only a few of them -- one out of five, as the United States representative, Mr. Dean, said on 15 August (ENDC/PV 70, p.39). That reminds us very much of the system of sampling as proposed within the framework of the discussion on general and complete disarmament. In both cases the United States would run "the risk" of failing to see and inspect everything, would look only for what it calls "reasonable assurance", as long as it fulfilled its desire to establish points of access to the territory of the other party. Mr. Dean has himself stated that:

"On-site inspection as proposed by the United States would involve the visit by international teams of the commission to only a very small portion of the vast territory of the Soviet Union." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p.7)

May I submit in passing that I can see no obsession with secrecy blocking the way to an agreement, as the Western delegations try so often to suggest; instead, we face a veritable obsession with the idea of ensuring footholds on the other parties' territory, which quite naturally makes those concerned take defensive measures.

In his speech today the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, insisted at length on the risk of the undetected underground explosion. It is now known that the other party should be more concerned about that since tests of that kind have been carried out mainly by the United States. Mr. Dean said (supra, p.20) that a single test was sufficient to determine significant progress in nuclear arms, but a few days ago he cited a series of at least 40 such tests.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

As regards risks and comparing the risks involved in not having an agreement with those arising from the fact that undetected events might occur, may I submit that it is not a question of two kinds of risks but of risks on one side and certainty on the other. This idea was very well illustrated in an article on a lecture by a United Kingdom scientist and man of letters, C.P. Snow, given in New York last year. I would like to quote part of his lecture. He said:

"We are faced with an Either/Or, and we haven't much time.

Either we accept a restriction of nuclear armaments. This is going to begin, just as a token, with an agreement on the stopping of nuclear tests. ... I am not going to conceal from you that this course involves certain risks; they are quite obvious and no honest man is going to blink them. That is the 'Either'. The 'Or' is not a risk but a certainty. It is this: there is no agreement on tests, the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union not only continues but accelerates, other countries join in. ... That is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have a finite risk; on the other side we have a certainty of disaster. Between a risk and a certainty a sane man does not hesitate."

Exactly four months have passed since our Committee was presented with a most remarkable document, the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), which is the result of sincere endeavours to help the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement and is meant to offer a new basis for negotiation, a basis different from the old positions of the parties; it is a document of compromise designed to lead our negotiations out of the deadlock. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries represented here have accepted the memorandum as basis for negotiations, being convinced that, in present conditions, only on that basis can a nuclear test ban treaty be rapidly concluded. We regret that so far the Western Powers are, in fact, maintaining the position of non-acceptance of the eight-nation memorandum. In evaluating the attitude to the memorandum adopted by the Western delegations one observes that in order to evade it they have resorted to at least four approaches in a period of four months. We have all been witnesses to the practice followed by them, that is why I shall take the liberty of only referring to it.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

The first approach consisted of putting a great many questions to the authors of the memorandum with the obvious aim of raising doubts about its efficacy. After that, unwilling either to accept the memorandum or to confess the fact openly, the Western delegations said they accepted the memorandum as one of the bases of negotiation; "one of the bases" meant that they wished to keep their old basis, which had proved a hindrance to the attainment of agreement. They proceeded then -- and that was the third approach -- to assert that the memorandum and their own proposals of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9) were identical. But that attempt too failed because the memorandum -- a document of compromise -- could not be and in fact is not identical with the old United States position. That brings us to the fourth approach of the Western delegations -- the substitution of their so-called new proposals for the eight-nation memorandum, of which they now speak only in passing. That, then, is the situation. The non-aligned States have put forward the necessary basis for negotiation; the Soviet Union and all the socialist States represented here have accepted it as such. It now depends only on the Western Powers to agree that on that basis real negotiations can be conducted and an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests reached.

I must associate myself with the appeal made, today in the very interesting speech by the representative of Brazil (supra. pp.14-17), who called for further negotiations and further exploration of the possibility of an agreement between the nuclear Powers on the basis of the memorandum. If one really wishes to have fruitful negotiations, not sterile discussions, one must take as the point of departure this document, as it is, and not as some of us might wish it to be. We must also put an end to any attempts, lacking perspective, to "technicize" an essentially political issue, which now requires a political solution. The determination, the desire, of those Powers to put an end for ever to nuclear tests is a position implying courage and responsibility -- courage to give up old positions; responsibility for the life, health, civilization and security of millions of people.

Baron von PLATEN (Sweden): I have asked for permission to speak in order to deliver a statement which on many points deals exclusively with general and complete disarmament, and in particular with problems pertaining to control, verification and inspection. Thus the proper place and time for my statement would have been that section of our debate today which deals with general and complete disarmament.

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

However, I shall also dwell at some length on the general nature of control problems, and as these are to a great extent -- to an all too great extent, I sometimes feel -- in the foreground of our test ban discussions I should be most grateful if I could be permitted to use this point, namely, the threshold between the nuclear debate and the debate on general and complete disarmament to state a case and to ask some questions. I beg your permission, Mr. Chairman, with the kind indulgence of my colleagues, to include both the general and the particular aspects of the control problem.

Let me first, in order to facilitate an orderly exposé and discussion of the problems, remind the Committee that we can, as Mr. Dean has already outlined, design control to fulfil highly different tasks. It may, for example, cover verification of destruction of arms and demobilization of troops -- the "bonfire" solution. We may also have control over production of military material -- let us call it the "production and replacement" issue; inspection for illegally hidden weapons and clandestine military forces or installations -- for short, the "weapons under the jacket" issue, and in that type we could perhaps include the verification in loco we have discussed today; and, finally, control designed to deal with certain problems connected with by-products of military significance of advances in purely peaceful science and technology -- let us call it, using a paradisaical term, the problem of "the fruit of knowledge".

Whatever the intended task, control which would stand any chance of being accepted -- and this applies both to general and complete disarmament and to a test ban agreement -- under present conditions and could at the same time contain elements for safeguarding the implementation of a treaty in the long run should as I see it, fulfil certain criteria, perhaps in particular the following four:

1. control should give all sides a reasonable assurance that agreed commitments regarding disarmament and, of course, a nuclear test ban, were being fulfilled;
2. the control and verification mechanism should give opportunity to any country suspected of violating an agreement to free itself from unjust accusations, to prove its innocence;
3. any verification measures should, as far as possible, be devised in such a way that they would not give the opportunity for observations of military significance outside, or beyond, the intended perimeter of control. I use the word

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

"perimeter", of course, in a general sense: that is to say inspection and verification should not divulge military or para-military facts or cover installations which were legally admissible according to a disarmament treaty and which the country in question wanted to retain as secret;

4. control should be reasonably inexpensive and easy to operate.

Direct control over the physical destruction of armaments would seem to be of a type which would fulfil the four criteria I have just outlined. Doubt and controversy would thus mainly pertain to how far that type of control would suffice. That is a problem which we have already dealt with on several occasions. I feel, however, that it deserves further consideration and discussion in depth. I will revert to that issue.

As long as suspicion prevails we may need kinds of control other than the direct one I have just been dealing with. Perhaps it would facilitate our task if we tried to work out indirect control measures, where agreement may be easier to reach than in the field of direct control over retained armaments. I feel justified in asking the Committee and, in particular, the co-Chairmen whether they would not regard it as worth while to consider how to handle this problem. It could obviously be dealt with in plenary meetings, or it could be left to experts -- perhaps to a sub-committee.

Whichever approach is preferred, two aspects should be kept in mind: first, that these problems are highly technical and must be studied seriously by competent experts and, secondly, that perhaps repercussions of the General Assembly on our work schedule here may leave us time and opportunity comfortably to concentrate on technical problems of this kind. Sooner or later, one way or another, we will need advice on the problems and possibilities of indirect control over armaments, mainly through control of national budgets and related economic and demographic data, labour market statistics, and so on, and suitable forms of control over industrial production. In this field there already exists a vast amount of facts and figures. A first task, then, would be to collate and analyse existing statistics and eventually to point out what further data would be needed.

I stress the desirability of an over-all approach to this problem, since budget figures alone often tell a story which is very hard to interpret if not related to other economic data, as, for example, national income accounts and census of production. As there is available, let it be added, a great wealth of such facts regularly published by all countries in the world, east and west, north and south, it would seem advisable to avail ourselves of it in order to facilitate the designing of the type of control needed.

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

I should like to make a final remark on the point of indirect control. Mr. Lall told us recently of the desirability of having "no production at all of weapons except spare parts" (ENDC/PV.27, p.15). Mr. Zorin, commenting upon that statement, said "One cannot agree more". Mr. Dean has also shown a great deal of positive interest in this subject.

If this goal were to be generally accepted, then agreement on control measures of an indirect and/or direct type over production would seem to be within our easy grasp. I do not need to stress the immense benefits we would all derive from an agreement halting the spiral of armaments expenditure -- and, still more, if we could turn that spiral downwards. Such indirect control, in addition to the direct verification of the physical destruction of weapons, demobilization and so on would, perhaps, in any case facilitate our task by greatly diminishing the sector for which other kinds of control would be felt to be indispensable.

The United States delegation, however, may ask why I do not envisage right from the beginning some application of the ingenious zonal inspection plan. In short, my answer is that I doubt the advisability of introducing such methods during our very first steps on the road to disarmament as they seem to imply some risk of not fulfilling the criteria dealing with non-divulgence of military secrets which are legally admissible.

We may be justified at present in feeling that we can safely start disarmament under fairly simple controls but that the need for really reassuring controls, especially over retained armaments, eventually will grow at a faster rate than the proposed disarmament measures: that is to say, that if we put disarmament against time as one curve from zero to 100 and control as another curve from zero to 100, then the control curve may start below, or after, the disarmament curve, but will at some point intersect it. This is, as I have said, perhaps a reasonable assumption. Mr. Godber seemed to foresee difficulties because, on the one hand, there was a need to ascertain -- if the Soviet proposal were accepted -- that no nuclear vehicles were hidden while at the same time fear of full control facilities might be voiced because of the high level of remaining conventional armaments, that is to say, there would be 70 per cent of conventional armaments whilst all nuclear delivery vehicles were destroyed. These doubts and counter-doubts, this double aspect of suspicion, is human and natural enough. Without belittling the issues -- which certainly deserve to be studied in depth and detail -- the reasoning seems to be based on the assumption that all things remain unchanged in the world during implementation of general and complete disarmament and a test ban treaty. Frankly, that is not realistic.

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

Let us consider the evolution which disarmament sets in motion, and of course which can be set in motion by a very partial measure like a test ban treaty. The actual armaments race is a race for safety in armaments. It is also a sign of general and international distrust. There is a high degree of correlation and causal relationship between international tension and armaments. A reversal of the present armaments race can begin, and would surely begin, if confidence were re-established among nations. I believe we are justified in having some optimism also as regards the eventual effect on international relations of a world disarming and free from further nuclear testing. Such a world may not change human nature but it may call forth types of national and individual reactions and behaviour other than those we have today. If we could initially achieve a test ban treaty and, let us say, 30, or perhaps only 15 or 10 per cent general disarmament, then we might release a decline in international tension. We would get a calmer, better climate in which to negotiate. Suspicion regarding illegally retained clandestine military forces and installations and weapons "hidden under the jacket" would be likely to diminish. Fears of various inspection proposals would also most likely diminish; to what extent it is difficult to foresee today. But in all probability our task would be simplified. Once disarmament had started we would be likely to feel less need for inspection and less fear of it. As time went by we would also gradually acquire improved methods for verification. Indeed, we face problems today many of which may never occur in a disarming world.

I believe we are justified in drawing certain conclusions from this. The Soviet Foreign Minister has pointed out that to start disarmament we need an act of will. We agree with that. It would be futile to wait for peaceful international relations for a political détente. We are not likely to see international confidence bestowed upon us by a generous providence, as a windfall. Thus it is important to start a nuclear test ban treaty, to start disarmament, and to reach agreement -- perhaps, as I have already indicated, even on limited steps. In this context I would like to remind the Committee of the Swedish views as expressed by our Foreign Minister in this forum on 20 March. Mr. Unden said then:

"I have ... wanted to draw your attention to the possibility that the chances for success, at least within limited areas, might increase if we study a group of specific problems -- especially those which offer hope of a positive solution within the limits of control at present acceptable to the main parties -- simultaneously with the complex of problems entailed in our task of achieving general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.5, p.22)

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Green, has approached the problem, I believe I am right in saying, in a somewhat similar vein.

Once general and complete disarmament is started, even if the beginning is modest and confined to limited areas, perhaps even to such a limited area -- which is not proper disarmament -- as a nuclear test ban treaty, a tremendous train of events would be set in motion. If we get a clear picture of what is feasible now, without the control issue blocking the way, we may find renewed courage and faith to tackle the remaining problems. Still more important than our own convenience we would show the world that unity and results are possible.

This conviction that our chances for general success would increase with partial success, leads me to formulate a question, namely, whether the Committee and the two Co-chairmen think it would facilitate the harmonization of the United States and the Soviet Union plans if we tried to work out maximum disarmament in what I would, for want of a better expression, like to call a package deal. That package deal would contain pre-stage I elements -- collateral measures -- and suitable elements from stage I within the limits of control at present acceptable to the main parties, i.e., I suppose, mainly direct control over weapons destruction, demobilization and liquidation of bases -- the "bonfire-approach", perhaps supplemented with some kind of economic-industrial "production and replacement" control.

Within any such package, balance of course has to be maintained. If the package deal is limited, then the purely military balance would be of less importance, whilst the political balance could be more decisive. If it is a big and comprehensive package, then a great deal of thought has to be devoted to all facets of the problem of balance. The selection of concessions for a package deal, and the matching of the totals of these concessions, obviously would in any case be a difficult task of detailed assessment. The eight non-aligned countries may facilitate the task of getting a harmonized view, but progress would essentially depend on the co-operation offered by and between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, let me add some few further remarks. I do not expect an answer, or even a reaction, to this suggestion at present. Perhaps the "war of the brackets" will eventually yield positive results and a unified treaty text. Let us by all means first exhaust the remaining possibilities in this approach. If the desired results were not forthcoming, the Committee could, however, consider other ways and methods, including the approach which I have outlined. Further a package deal is in no way a substitute for general and complete disarmament; nor is it

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

meant to imply general and complete disarmament begun without a comprehensive blueprint which, in any case, would be a doubtful method as we have no guarantee that disarmament would lend itself to the kind of continuous negotiations which we have, for example, in GATT when practicing gradual economic disarmament. Finally, I have some hope that a package deal would yield rather substantive results, as there seems to be a great deal of unity already between Mr. Dean and the representative of the Soviet Union regarding "bonfire" and -- I hope that I am right in adding -- "production replacement" controls.

No full agreement on general and complete disarmament seems likely before we have settled the issue of control over illegally retained armaments -- "weapons hidden under the jacket". As regards a test ban I refer to the basis offered in the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries. In other aspects it would be premature and presumptuous for me to try to outline the elements in a solution to this complex problem. Let me, however, humbly but firmly express a hope that any discussion, whether on a test ban treaty or on general and complete disarmament, will be workman-like, business-like, calm and dispassionate. If we cannot achieve this atmosphere here and now, then let us try to create it, perhaps through the package deal method. In any case, do not let us be over-ambitious regarding control, nor too suspicious about the implications of inspection and verification. This approach, is, incidentally, I think, supported by our experience in the nuclear test ban negotiations. In his brilliant intervention on 30 July (ENDC/PV.63, pp. 5 et seq.) Mr. Lall, the representative of India, also dealt with this problem of time and change. I hope that I have understood him rightly when I say that he too supported the approach of non-suspicion which I have just outlined.

One further brief remark. Do not let us be influenced or over-awed by the fact that the United States and the USSR seem to hold rather contradictory views in this field of control and verification. I do not think that those differences exist solely or mainly because of the present political configuration of the world. The problems which we face are to such a degree psychological and general in nature that I venture to suggest that, had not the two great Powers brought them into focus, others would have felt obliged to do so. What we can hope for and what we should ask is that the problems be not unduly complicated by the fact that opposite views are presented by the two Powers just referred to, but should be dealt with through objective, painstakingly detailed analysis.

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

Finally, a few remarks about the relationship between science, freedom and disarmament. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, in his statement on 15 August, talked about the cosmonauts. Incidentally, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate warmly the Soviet Government and the Soviet peoples on that magnificent achievement. Mr. Kuznetsov said:

"The combined flight provides striking evidence of the outstanding achievements of the Soviet people in the field of science and technology, and evidence of the fact that the Soviet Union is striving to make all its achievements serve useful purposes. But if the achievements of science and technology are used for other than peaceful purposes, they may bring mankind untold calamities." (ENDC/PV.70, p.48)

Those words "untold calamities" are infinitely frightening, true and realistic. What is more, the opinion expressed in Mr. Kuznetsov's statement is valid not only during periods of international tension and an armaments race, but might also retain their validity during disarmament, for our experience is that acquisition of knowledge goes on at an accelerating tempo and that knowledge once acquired is generally an irreversible thing. Thus, if general and complete disarmament, or a test ban treaty, once started, should not produce freedom and a communal feeling among scientists and technical people, as well as among nations and Governments, then even the best-laid plans could become obsolete and unworkable.

In disarmament -- and here I include, perhaps not quite logically, the test ban treaty -- and the related subject of control, verification and inspection we are all somewhat like doctors and patients at the same time. Every measure of control bears the impact of this duality. We often hesitate to admit it. Listening to the debate here I sometimes get the impression that one side seems to base its arguments on the assumption that it, and it alone, will be the object of verification and control; the other side does not always seem to realize the implications in practice of its high control requirements. But surely we can and must admit the duality in that we all want a maximum of control over others and a minimum for ourselves; and we must try to meet somewhere in the middle.

To sum up, I venture first to ask the co-Chairmen to consider the feasibility of including in our work schedule at an appropriate time technical discussions on indirect control measures. Secondly, we express the hope that possibilities be kept in mind regarding a realistic deal for maximum disarmament before and/or within the first stage, with mainly direct controls, the package being so constructed as to

(Baron von Platen, Sweden)

promote international confidence and thus facilitate agreement on subsequent steps. Thirdly, we hope that we shall approach the residual control issues, those that remain unsolved -- and, I am sorry to say, we must include today the test ban treaty -- with greater mutual confidence. Such confidence would undoubtedly be more useful in our deliberations, and even perhaps more realistic in a long-term analysis than a projection of today's distrust onto a world which we are trying to create.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has listened carefully to the views expressed by the members of this Committee on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. An interesting statement was made by the representative of Poland, Mr. Lachs (ENDC/PV.70) in which he demonstrated in a most thorough manner the unsoundness of the United States position with regard to the eight-Power memorandum (ENDC/28) and explained convincingly that the proposals set forth in the memorandum offer a good basis for reaching agreement. The representative of Czechoslovakia also made a useful contribution to our work (ENDC/PV.70). I should like to draw your attention to one passage in the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, who said that to date the eight-Power memorandum remained the best and the most practical proposal which could serve as the basis for the solution of the problem of the discontinuance of tests (ibid., p.23). We note that the representatives of Bulgaria and Romania have today made new positive contributions, seeking in every possible way to help forward a speedy solution to the problems before the Eighteen Nation Committee. We have also listened with interest to the statement of the representative of Sweden, which we shall study carefully. As regards the statements made by the representative of Brazil on 14 August (ENDC/PV.69) and again today, I should like to deal with them somewhat later.

I should also like to express my profound gratitude to the representatives who have today congratulated the new Soviet cosmonauts and addressed their good wishes to the Soviet people in connexion with the successful completion of the flights of space ships Vostok 3 and Vostok 4.

To my regret, an analysis of the three statements made by the representative of the United States has shown that the United States representative has not introduced anything hopeful or constructive into the debate by his statements. The United States representative touched upon various aspects of the problem of discontinuing tests; he spoke at some length about the background of our negotiations,

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

about the scientific aspect of the matter, and about the similarities between inspection to verify the discontinuance of tests and control over general and complete disarmament. Moreover, Mr. Dean asserted that the fundamental main requisite for the achievement of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests must be recognition of the principle of obligatory international on-site inspection. That is the gist of all the statements made by the United States representative.

Mr. Dean stated on 9 August in the three-Power Sub-Committee:

"The keystone to an agreement is the obligation to facilitate the on-site inspections called for under the treaty" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.23, p.5).

What is one to say in this regard? The question of on-site inspection is not a new one, but since it is being raised again and again the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to say something also on this subject. Throughout the negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear tests this question has invariably been regarded by the Western Powers as of paramount importance. And if we are to talk about why the four-year negotiations in Geneva on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have been unsuccessful, it must be recognized that their failure to achieve results is due precisely to the desire of the Western Powers to make the solution of the problem of a nuclear test ban treaty dependent upon agreement by the Soviet Union to open its territory for legalized intelligence work under the guise of international control and inspection.

Referring to the conclusions of scientists, but following rather the views of their chiefs of staff and intelligence services, the representatives of the Western countries, month after month and year after year, have advanced the same "arguments" and "reasons" on the need for the presence in the territory of the Soviet Union of many hundreds of foreign controllers and inspectors and for the organization of numerous on-site inspections for verifying compliance by the other side with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

I should like to emphasize that the Soviet Union is no less interested in the establishment of effective control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests than is the United States or any other country. The Soviet Union has more reasons for showing concern about the security of its territory.

But is such international control over the cessation of tests which could be used as a cover for intelligence work really necessary? After studying the whole question carefully and thoroughly, after evaluating the existing means of

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

detecting nuclear explosions and after detailed and exhaustive consultations with scientists and technical experts the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that the demands put forward by the Western side cannot be justified. The Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that compliance with the obligations assumed under an agreement on the cessation of tests can be verified successfully and with adequate assurance by the already existing national means of detecting nuclear explosions.

This conclusion is confirmed by the abundant material coming from existing national institutes, stations and other means of detection. This material shows that the national systems have successfully coped with the task of detecting in practice all nuclear weapon tests that have so far been carried out by the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

The data concerning the detection of the nuclear explosions which have been carried out up to the present time, about which Mr. Krishna Menon, Mrs. Myrdal and other representatives have already spoken here in the Committee, and on which the scientists of many countries, including the United States, have written, confirm the aforementioned conclusion that national means of detection fulfil all the practical requirements for verifying that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is being complied with by the parties.

These national means fully proved their efficiency also during the period of 1959-1961, when the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom did not carry out any nuclear explosions. During that time not a single misunderstanding arose; no one took earthquakes, which were then no less in number, for underground nuclear explosions and nobody had even any suspicion in this regard.

It was precisely in the light of the existing real circumstances, and with the desire to break the deadlock in the negotiations for the cessation of tests, that the Soviet Union submitted its proposals of 28 November 1961 for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water or underground -- using for the purpose of control national means of detecting nuclear explosions. As indicated in the statement of the Soviet Government on this matter (ENDC/11), the proposals of 28 November 1961 were based on a new approach to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests which would eliminate the difficulties and obstacles which had hampered the reaching of agreement in the past.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

At the same time the Soviet Union declared that its security would never be an object of bargaining in the negotiations on the cessation of tests and that any attempt to make this cessation dependent on the opening up of our territory to foreign intelligence could not serve as a basis for an agreement.

The approach suggested by the Soviet Union made it possible to solve immediately the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests without jeopardizing the security of States. It was a sound, practical and realistic approach guaranteeing reliable control over compliance by all States with their undertaking not to carry out nuclear weapon tests.

But the Western side refused to accept the new Soviet proposals, because acceptance of these proposals of the USSR would have upset the far-reaching plans and calculations of the military circles of the United States and its NATO allies.

This was the situation in the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests when the Eighteen Nation Committee began its work in March 1962. The Western Powers were stubbornly insisting on their demand to be given the right to carry out intelligence work under the guise of international control and inspection as an indispensable condition for the cessation of tests; in the situation where this attitude of the Western Powers had led to a deadlock in the negotiations, the non-aligned States, members of the Eighteen Nation Committee, put forward the compromise proposals contained in their joint memorandum of 16 April.

There is no need at present to repeat point by point the contents of this memorandum. The proposals set out in it are well known; they are now, in fact, the focal point of our discussions. It is more important to do something else and that is to recall again and again that these proposals have been accepted by the Soviet Union as the basis for achieving an agreement and that, in accepting them, the Soviet Union took a substantial step in the search for a mutually acceptable solution of the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests.

When the Soviet Union accepted the proposals of the non-aligned States, it realized, of course, that they were compromise proposals. What does their compromise nature consist in?

Recognizing that a system of continuous observation and effective control over the cessation of nuclear tests "might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions", the non-aligned countries adopted on this question a scientifically based position, having recognized that national detection systems are adequate for ensuring effective supervision over the cessation of tests.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

At the same time, to the extent to which it does not hinder a fair solution of the problem or affect the security interests of States, the position of the Western Powers has been taken into account in this memorandum. For instance, the memorandum proposes a substantial measure of an international nature, namely the setting up by agreement of an international commission consisting of a number of highly qualified scientists entrusted with the tasks of processing the data received from national detection systems and of reporting on any nuclear explosion or suspicious event on the basis of thorough and objective examination of all the available data. The memorandum further proposes that:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event." (ENDC/28, para. 4)

The proposal in regard to the most difficult question -- on-site inspection -- is also of a compromise nature. Permit me to deal with this proposal in somewhat more detail. It is all the more necessary to do so because in the statements made by the Western Powers the proposal regarding on-site inspection set forth in the memorandum is deliberately distorted and the meaning of the memorandum is depreciated.

A careful study of the memorandum shows that the authors of this document approach the question of on-site inspection in a very serious manner, from a standpoint which takes into account the situation that will arise as a result of the assumption by the nuclear Powers of the obligation to cease all nuclear tests. Accordingly, it is contemplated that the question of on-site inspection may arise only after a thorough and detailed examination by the international commission of the facts "necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event". Therefore this examination of the facts should be the first step.

After that, as the memorandum states:

"Should the Commission find that it was unable to reach a conclusion on the nature of a significant event it would so inform the party on whose territory that event had occurred, and simultaneously inform it of the points on which urgent clarification seemed necessary." (ibid., para. 5)

Thus the second step to be taken by the international commission would consist of notification and a request for co-operation addressed to the State on whose territory the event in question had occurred.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

What is to follow after that? After that:

"The party and the Commission should consult as to what further measures of clarification, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment". (ibid.)

It is envisaged here that the State on whose territory the event to be investigated had occurred would "give speedy and full co-operation to facilitate the assessment". (ibid.)

The Soviet Union subscribes to this without any reservation.

Such is the third stage of the work: joint consultation and the speedy and full co-operation of the State on whose territory the event had occurred.

It is at this third stage that the question of carrying out an on-site inspection may arise. This will depend on the specific facts, and on the specific situation. If, in the territory of a State, some event has occurred the nature of which is still not clear enough to the international commission even after consultations, then the State concerned may wish to clear itself of all possible suspicion on the part of anyone and will invite the commission for this purpose.

What would be the considerations by which the nuclear Power concerned would be guided in making such a decision?

It would have to take into account the fact that, if it did not invite the commission, then, as is stipulated in the memorandum of the non-aligned States "the International Commission would inform the parties to the treaty of all the circumstances of the case". In other words, the nuclear Power concerned would know that highly qualified scientists, members of the international commission, would inform all States and the public of the whole world that the nuclear Power in whose territory had occurred some unexplained event, had refused to invite the commission to make clear the nature of the event.

The nuclear Power would also have to take another factor into consideration -- namely to what extent the data submitted by it on the nature of the event, whose origin the international commission had declared to be unclear, really explained the nature of that event. In other words, the nuclear Power concerned would have to weigh up what other States would think and how world public opinion would react to the specific case -- whether the world at large would understand its refusal to invite the commission in that particular instance.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

As you see, all these are very serious matters for any nuclear Power.

In the light of all these considerations, is it possible to come to the conclusion that the nuclear Powers will always refuse to invite the commission to visit their territory? Of course, it is impossible to come to such a conclusion; it would be quite unjustified. It is clear that any government will in each specific case approach the question with great care, taking all the circumstances into account.

Therefore, it appears that the formula of on-site inspection by invitation, while not providing for such inspection on an obligatory basis, nevertheless does not preclude the possibility of on-site inspection in specific cases. This is truly a compromise formula.

Consequently, the proposals contained in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries duly take into account the positions of both sides, and the Soviet Government has expressed its readiness to accept these proposals as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

What is the attitude of the United States in regard to these proposals? In the course of our discussions the United States representative tried to make out that the United States proposals in their renovated form correspond to or, as he said, are consistent with the provisions of the joint memorandum. It is not the first time that we have had to listen to such assertions. Even before the United States submitted its new proposals, the representative of the United States claimed just as decisively that his earlier proposals were consistent with the provisions of the memorandum. But that was not proved before, and it has not been proved even now.

If the members of the United States delegation dispute our conclusion, if they continue to assert that the United States has in fact adopted the positions outlined in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries, why then does the United States so stubbornly refuse to accept this memorandum as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests? Give us an answer to this question, Mr. Dean.

You do not accept the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for agreement; you refuse to start working jointly to prepare a treaty on the basis of the compromise proposals contained in this memorandum. Instead, you are trying to lead the Committee off on a side track. You have given evidence of this even in your speech today.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Mr. Dean tries to make out that science is to blame for the unconstructive attitude of the United States Government and for its stubborn refusal to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. When one listens to the United States representative, one might think that the United States Government would really have nothing against accepting, as the basis, proposals which would be acceptable to other States as well and which would raise no suspicion that control was being used as a cover for intelligence activities. The whole trouble is, you see, that the United States scientists are opposed to this and the United States Government cannot, apparently, do anything with its scientists.

This concept, artificially contrived from beginning to end, has been selected with the sole aim of diverting the attention of the Committee from its serious work in preparing an agreement. This manoeuvre is being used by the Government of the United States --- and not for the first time --- to lead our discussions to a deadlock. Of course, it is not really a question of scientists and it is not they who are to be blamed for the United States Government's taking such a negative position on the question of the cessation of tests.

Indeed, why is the Committee asked again and again to study certain data? What are these data? It appears, according to the information given us by the United States representative, that the Department of Defense of the United States --- in other words, the Pentagon --- carried out a considerable amount of work to prove the necessity of sending intelligence groups to the territory of the parties to the agreement. Since it was the Pentagon which dealt with this matter, there can be no doubt about the kind of conclusions that were reached.

The representative of the United States is trying to make out that these so-called "new data" are the latest word, and almost the only one, in the science of seismology. But obviously Mr. Dean must know that among scientists in the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western countries, there is no unanimity of view on the issue under consideration. The representative of the United States wants us to believe in the correctness of the conclusions which he has submitted to us here, but in the Western countries themselves some scientists hold differing views on this matter.

If we turn to the "new data" about which Mr. Dean has talked so much here, we cannot fail to recall that the point of view which during past years has been defended by some United States scientists on the question of discontinuing tests is no other

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

than the political point of view of the Government of the United States, only cloaked in a mantle of scientific terminology. This is shown quite clearly by the fact that in the United States it is precisely the "scientific data" needed by the United States Government at a particular moment which promptly come to light every time as if to order.

We have already reminded you a few days ago of the fact that in January 1959, when at the Geneva Conference of the three Powers there was some prospect of an agreement, the Government of the United States suddenly declared that it had scientific data which practically ruled out the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts of 1958. I think hardly anybody will venture to deny that it was precisely these "new data" that were made use of by the United States at the time as a pretext to avoid reaching agreement. After that, in the United States a group of scientists, headed by Dr. Lloyd Berkner, prepared a report which made even more dismal prognostications, reaching the conclusion that under certain circumstances even powerful underground nuclear explosions would be impossible to detect at all. But what has actual experience shown us?

The United States low yield underground explosion carried out under Project Gnome on 10 December 1961 -- this has already been mentioned, but I think it is relevant to repeat it once more -- was clearly detected by a seismic station near Tokyo, at a distance of 7,200 miles, by the Swedish seismic station at Uppsala, at a distance of 5,500 miles, in Finland, at a distance of 5,500 miles and beyond the northern Arctic circle, at a distance of 2,500 miles. But what is most interesting is the fact that the underground nuclear explosion of Project Gnome was carried out precisely in the conditions in which, according to the "new United States data" of 1959 and the Berkner report, it would be impossible to detect an underground nuclear explosion many times greater in yield.

This embarrassing situation was of course no coincidence. We do not wish to intervene in controversies between United States scientists, but we still cannot pass over the fact that the world famous seismologist, Mr. Lewis Don Leet, Professor of Geology and Director of the Seismological Station at Harvard University, has recently shed light on the way the above-mentioned Berkner report was worked out. In an article published in the newspaper National Guardian in April 1962 Leet wrote that no professional seismologists took part in these studies and that the only members

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

of the Berkner group who were acquainted to some extent with seismology were electronic engineers with a superficial knowledge of the subject. Leet wrote that not to make use in such a project of seismologists working at seismic stations was the same as reconsidering the system of measurements without consulting the Bureau of Standards.

But why did all this happen? Why did they not even wish to listen to Mr. Leet, who went twice to Washington to offer his services and methods to the Government of the United States? Because, as Mr. Leet has himself shown, the Government of the United States misuses technical data to support its political position. In his letter addressed to the newspaper, the New York Times which that newspaper refused to publish, Leet wrote that he categorically dissociated himself from the attempt to depict oneself as the helpless victim of ruthless nature and to base one's policy on the "experimentally proved" difficulty of detecting by seismographic means violations of an agreement through the carrying out of underground explosions.

In this connexion one may also refer to the statement of the science editor William Boggs, who wrote in an article entitled "Seismology and Diplomacy" published in The New Republic on 28 May 1962:

"The seismologists feel that the questions involved in the Geneva talks are political, not scientific; and many of them resent the implication that science, not diplomacy is to blame for the stalemate".

Boggs stressed further that:

"The seismological evidence suggests that the present US policy in Geneva exaggerates the difficulty of policing a test ban treaty. The two main reasons seem to be; first, that planners in the State Department believe that an uninspected treaty would set a dismal precedent for negotiations on general disarmament; and second, the planners in the Atomic Energy Commission, the CIA and the Department of Defence must somehow justify their demands for control and inspection ..."

Mr. Boggs concluded his article with the following recommendation:

"Finally, the only kind of treaty we may be able to get might be a nationally monitored one. This, of course, would require a reappraisal of US policy, and a strategic retreat from a position based more on propaganda than on scientific fact. To save the earth from further radioactive contamination, to put a brake on the race to test nuclear

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

weapons, and to take even one halting, sceptical step toward disarmament, the price would seem to me to be a small one. One fact is certain: the next break-through on the test-ban problem will have to come not from the laboratory, but from the White House".

I will give another example. On 14 April 1962 eight United States professors published an article entitled "Reply to Teller" or "The Aftermath of Hiroshima" in the magazine Saturday Evening Post. They wrote about underground tests that since 1958 Dr. Teller, in his categorical opposition to reaching agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests, had based himself on the argument that the other side might cheat. But no cheating was possible with regard to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and now it was known that even underground tests could not remain hidden.

I could extend the list of statements by scientists which are basically at variance with the concepts expounded by Mr. Dean, but I do not wish to encroach on the Committee's time. It seems to me that the main point is sufficiently clear, namely that in solving the political problem before us we cannot hide behind the names of scientists. We have already lost too much time.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have now sent a group of scientists to Geneva to try and convince the members of the Committee of the need for obligatory international inspection, the intention being to refute in some way or other the basis for agreement put forward in the memorandum now under consideration. Does this action by the Western Powers contribute to the reaching of agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests? Our answer to that question is a categorical negative. It merely hampers our work and renders more difficult a compromise solution of the problem on the basis of the proposals of the eight non-aligned States.

It is difficult to believe that the Government of the United States does not realize the real state of affairs. In fact, of course, the United States understands just as well as the Soviet Union does the fundamental possibility of solving the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests on the basis proposed in the memorandum. And if it nevertheless spends so much time, effort and energy in trying to prove that it is impossible to agree to the conclusion of an agreement on this basis, particularly in view of the so-called risk with regard to underground nuclear explosions, then we must point out the following fact. The United States is well aware that there is in fact no question of any risk for it in this regard. The Soviet Union

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

does not carry out underground nuclear tests; such tests are carried out by the United States itself, and moreover on a large scale. Therefore, if we talk of a risk connected with the conclusion of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests on the basis of the eight-Power memorandum, such a risk would be more likely to exist for the Soviet Union than for the United States.

Why then, is the United States so persistent in putting forward its groundless demands for obligatory inspection, an international control system and so on? We are becoming more and more convinced that differences of opinion on the question of control and inspection are put forward by the United States in order to block the solution of the problem of putting an end to tests.

The Soviet Union is sincerely trying to achieve a solution of this problem and expresses its willingness to adopt the proposals of the non-aligned States as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. But the United States obviously does not wish to reach agreement on the cessation of tests; it wishes to continue testing. Not venturing to say so openly, the United States avails itself of the question of control, including obligatory inspection, in order to keep the negotiations on the cessation of tests at a standstill.

In this connexion I should like to draw attention to the information that is going round concerning the intention of the United States to carry out a further series of nuclear tests at the end of this year or at the beginning of next year. United States senators have made statements to this effect and they are supported by the United States press. The series of tests which the United States is carrying out this year has already raised the nuclear arms race to an unprecedented level and has made it even more dangerous. Yet the United States is now preparing to raise the spiral of the arms race even higher and to add a few more spirals.

Leading statesmen in the United States make no secret of the aims they are pursuing in intensifying the nuclear arms race. In March 1962 President Kennedy of the United States stated that the United States wished to have the lead in the field of nuclear weapons. What does the United States need to have this lead for? On this subject the Secretary for Defense, Mr. McNamara, said bluntly in his well-known statement on 16 June 1962 at the University of Michigan:

"We cannot hope to achieve our aim unless we act from a position of strength."

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

In the light of these statements by leading statesmen of the United States it becomes even clearer that on the question of nuclear weapon tests and, in particular, on the question of control over the discontinuance of such tests, it is not mere details that divide us. It is a difference of principle in the general political policy. The Soviet Union firmly and consistently pursues the policy of the peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems; the policy of peace, peaceful co-operation, the settlement of all outstanding international problems through negotiations; the policy of general and complete disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

This policy of the Soviet Union was restated on 15 August 1962 in the appeal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to the Communist Party and Peoples of the Soviet Union, to the Peoples and Governments of all countries and to all progressive humanity. The appeal solemnly declares that the Soviet State is consistently and steadfastly fighting for a lasting peace throughout the world, and that the Soviet Government fully supports the demands of the peoples for the establishment of lasting peace throughout the world and is doing its utmost for the fulfilment of these just demands. This historical document declares that:

"The Soviet Government again appeals to all governments and peoples to struggle with still greater persistence to rid humanity of the threat of a thermo-nuclear war and to bring about indestructible peace on earth." (ENDC/57, p.5)

Unfortunately, the United States pursues a different policy. It is guided by the desire to create a 'position of strength', a 'position of nuclear leadership', in order to impose its will on other peoples. The Soviet Government has repeatedly pointed out the danger of this policy for the peace of the world.

If the United States is really interested, as its representatives have stated here, in halting the nuclear arms race and in concluding an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, it has every opportunity of proving this in practice. To do so the United States has only to stop insisting on impracticable and unrealistic conditions for such an agreement -- and the question of nuclear weapon tests will be settled in the shortest possible time on the basis of the proposals of the eight non-aligned States. These proposals provide a broad compromise basis for agreement.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

We have listened with great attention to the statements made by the representative of Brazil, Mr. Castro, today and on previous occasions. We should heed the appeal which the representative of Brazil made on 14 August (ENDC/PV.69, p.47) to transform -- as he put it -- the eight-nation document into an eighteen-nation joint memorandum, because even seventeen may not be enough.

Today Mr. Castro submitted his Government's statement on this question. We share the anxiety and concern expressed by the Brazilian Government with regard to the unjustified delay in settling the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union that agreement on this question has not yet been reached. The views expressed by Mr. Castro deserve serious attention and we will study them carefully.

As a preliminary comment I should like to say that our attitude to the proposal put forward by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, is favourable. We believe that the view of the representative of Brazil that as from a certain date about which Mr. Nervo spoke, all nuclear explosions should be stopped deserves careful study. We are ready to give our full co-operation in this matter. The problem of the cessation of nuclear tests calls for a speedy solution. The Soviet delegation expresses its willingness to get down to practical business -- even tomorrow -- in order to work out a draft treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests on the basis of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States. Is the Western side ready to do so? On the answer to this question depends the possibility of making progress in solving the problem of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): It is now after 1.20 p.m. and I still have on my list the names of the United Kingdom representative and the representative of Italy who wish to exercise the right of reply. I hope that it will not be necessary for them to speak at very great length.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): There are a number of remarks which I should like to make arising out of speeches that have been made this morning, but in view of the lateness of the hour I should be most willing to defer my intervention until the next meeting, on the understanding, if my colleagues would agree, that I would have the right to make my intervention on the subject of nuclear tests at that meeting.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): The representative of the United Kingdom has offered to defer his remarks to the next meeting. To some extent that raises the question of the subject of discussion at the next meeting. I recall the proposal of the representative of Italy at a previous meeting (ENDC/PV.69, p.48) that this discussion on the nuclear test ban should go on without interruption in plenary meetings until all those who wished to speak had had an opportunity of doing so. I understand that there are other representatives who might wish to speak. Therefore, before I call on the representative of Italy who wishes to exercise the right of reply, we might take the views of the Committee, and particularly of the co-Chairmen, on whether at our next plenary meeting, which will be held on Monday next, we should continue the discussion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests until all representatives who wish to speak have done so.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): If there are other representatives who wish to speak on this subject I do not think I, or my co-Chairman, would wish in any way to prevent the discussion continuing. But we do have a large number of other subjects connected with general and complete disarmament, and if we desire to make an effort before we go to the United Nations General Assembly we are running out of time. There are some very important matters on which we want to concentrate, including that of the report which we will make to the General Assembly. But, speaking personally and subject to what my co-Chairman has to say, I would say that if any representative wishes to speak further at the next meeting I certainly would have no objection.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I share the views which my co-Chairman, the United States representative, has expressed. Of course the Soviet delegation takes the view that all who wish to speak should have the opportunity to do so. With regard to our work before the recess, I think also that the views expressed by the United States representative deserve attention. But as regards the question of our work on other problems on the agenda, in view of the fact that there are representatives who wish to speak on the question of cessation of tests, apparently we shall not take up the other problems. Therefore, to sum up, I support the views expressed by the representative of the United States, my co-Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Having heard the views of the co-Chairmen, does any other representative wish to speak on the proposition that at our next meeting, on Monday next, those who may have remarks to make on the question of nuclear tests should have the first opportunity of doing so?

I take it that that is agreed by the Committee.

I now ask the representative of Italy if he desires to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have asked for the floor not so much in order to exercise my right of reply as to speak on a point of order, because certain interpretations of the statement I made yesterday have appeared in a number of newspapers which are likely to create confusion and doubt among the delegations meeting here with regard to the meaning of my statement and the position of the Italian delegation.

In the course of my statement at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.70, pp. 17 et seq.) I first of all explained once again the opinion of the Italian delegation on the meaning and scope of the eight-Power memorandum. I then suggested that despite the differences existing between the points of view of the nuclear Powers, the Conference should continue the study of the various problems relating to the prohibition of nuclear tests and of the relevant questions in relation to the memorandum.

I stressed one of these problems in particular, namely the problem relating to a possible partial agreement limited to tests in the atmosphere and underwater.

It may turn out, in fact, that owing to the deplorable intransigence of the Soviet delegation with regard to a comprehensive treaty accompanied by safeguards, we may at some point have to devote our efforts to the conclusion of a limited treaty. A comprehensive treaty obviously remains the most desirable solution towards which we must direct our efforts without ceasing and above all else.

I thought it necessary to make these points clear because several newspapers, obviously on the basis of inaccurate information, ascribed to the position of my delegation certain meanings which are at variance with the policy of the Italian Government and with that which the Italian delegation has always followed and continues to follow here, as is natural.

This position consists in our seeking, in close collaboration with the Western countries and with the aid of all, for the conclusion of agreements with a view to putting an end to the nuclear arms race and achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament, both of them under proper international control.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): We have heard the correction which the representative of Italy has given to some statements which appeared in the newspapers recently.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I listened with the greatest of interest to the statement made by our Soviet colleague this morning. Reference has been made to variously carefully culled statements made by certain selected United States scientists -- whom the Soviet Union loves to quote -- in their letters, published and unpublished, to a variety of journals. I have discussed this matter personally with some twenty-five or thirty, or perhaps even a larger number, of the leading scientists and seismologists in the United States. I have gone into the subject with them as carefully as I know how. I have had the benefit too of discussing it with a number of leading United Kingdom scientists who have been here, men who are distinguished in their field, as well as with scientists from some of the other delegations. And, as far as I know, there is no dispute that no matter what kind of system is devised, there will always be some undetected events which it will be impossible to identify for certain without on-site inspection.

The Soviet Union has proved to us many times, as it has just proved again, that it has some of the most distinguished scientists in the world. They have just made possible this most distinguished feat of the two cosmonauts. Therefore, I appeal to my Soviet colleague and urge him to bring here to Geneva some of those leading Soviet scientists in this field, many of whom are very distinguished. And let the other delegations bring their scientists too. We shall be most happy. Our own scientists have just gone home, but we shall be happy to bring them back. Let us thrash this question out. I do not wish to be polemical about it. If the Soviet Union has some advanced scientific knowledge in this field which our scientists do not have, let us trot it out and look at it. I should be delighted to look at it. I think that the more scientific knowledge we can get in this field the better. If I have unintentionally -- not intentionally, because I have tried to pursue this matter as scientifically as I know how -- made any mis-statements with regard to this field, and if the Soviet scientists can come here and prove that I am wrong, I will be the first to acknowledge it.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-first plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Burns, representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Brazil, the United States, Romania, Sweden, the Soviet Union and Italy.

"The delegation of Brazil tabled an official Note^{1/} by the Brazilian Government on the question of nuclear weapon tests.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 20 August 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/56.